Superfluous labor and state debt

In his “Apotheosis of Money”, Robert Kurz makes this statement:

“If State consumption and State credit, crushed together as if by an avalanche, play a central role in this development, this is also due of course, to the fact that the State (unlike a private entity which avails itself of credit) is considered to be a “secure debtor” which means, however, that the State, in the event of a great monetary and credit crisis, will not declare bankruptcy, but will simply expropriate its citizen-creditors.”

The argument Kurz makes here is that the unproductive consumption of surplus value, made possible by the credit extended to the state, is dependent on the state’s ability to repay its debt and must, sooner or later, result

Decreasing federal deficits preceded both the 2001 and 2008 crises. (Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve)
Decreasing federal deficits preceded both the 2001 and 2008 crises. (Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve)

in the state expropriating the owners of capital. I am not especially satisfied with the way Kurz formulates the problem here. My difficulty with Kurz’s formulation is probably best expressed in the words of the bourgeois simpleton, Paul Krugman — for reasons that are not entirely clear to the bourgeois simpletons the long-standing prediction of an impending crisis for Washington’s finances over the last thirty years never finally materialized:

“Fear of a Greek-style fiscal and financial crisis has loomed over much of our policy discourse over the past four years, and has played a significant role in shaping actual policy, constituting the principal argument for austerity in countries that don’t face any current difficulties in borrowing. However, despite repeated warnings that crises of confidence are imminent in floating-rate debtors – mainly the United States, the UK, and Japan – these crises keep not happening.”

Krugman has his explanation for why the predicted crisis “keeps not happening”, but he is a simpleton who thinks the problem is, “as simple and silly” as he is. Labor theory offers a much simpler and elegant explanation for why Washington has never experienced the sort of crisis predicted by bourgeois economists. It is an explanation I will need if I am to finally explain how reduction of hours of labor affects profits in an economy characterized by massive expenditures of unproductive labor time.

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As I mentioned, there is already a mass of capital that is incapable of functioning as capital, incapable of producing surplus value. This capital does not become unproductive because it is unproductively consumed by the state; rather it must be lent to the state because it is already unproductive, i.e., because it already is superfluous to the production of surplus value. On this assumption, at an earlier stage in the development of the mode of production, this excess capital would have suffered devaluation. Since the capital is incapable of operating productively, repayment of the debt does not figure in the discussion.

It is true debt is regularly retired by the state; and it is true the retired debt may be taken by its owners and invested productively; however, under the conditions I am considering (absolute overproduction of capital), the capital withdrawn from the state is immediately replaced by other capital that now cannot be employed productively and which must, therefore, be lent to the state. Thus the total mass of excess capital never falls, although it may change hands.

This argument generally follows Marx’s that some portion of capital must stand idle no matter that new capital might take the place of old capital in productive employment. Which capital can be employed productively and which must stand idle is, of course, settled by the competitive struggle. However the result of this struggle never changes: some definite given mass of capital must stand idle. This mass of idle capital constitutes accumulated state debt. Since this mass of idled capital does not decrease (under the assumption I am using), it follows that the state never has to repay it. The question of whether the state can repay this debt never enters the picture, except in the imagination of bourgeois simpletons.

The state is a “secure debtor” not because it can expropriate its citizens, but because the mass of superfluous capital that must be lent to it always increases. No matter how much the state might desire to reduce its debts, such a reduction is a fantasy dreamed up by “deficit hawks”. Retiring or even reducing the state’s total mass of debt has no basis in reality. Not only can state debt not be reduced, even the rate of growth of this debt is imposed on the state. Should fascist state officials try to reduce the rate of growth, as was attempted during the Clinton administration (see the accompanying chart), the result would be the same as occurred then: a crisis. The rate of growth of state debt is determined not by the aims or policies of the state, but by the accumulation of superfluous capital. The Tea Party learned this lesson the hard way, when the whole of Washington turned on it for interfering with the increase in the debt ceiling.

However it is not enough that the state should simply consume the superfluous capital. If the aim of the state were simply to consume superfluous capital, it could do this by taxing the capital and spending the revenue thus generated unproductively. But the crisis that produces superfluous capital and an excess population of workers is a crisis produced by the falling rate of profit. The superfluous capital must indeed be consumed, but it must be consumed in a way that adds to the mass of profit. From the standpoint of the mode of production, the superfluous capital cannot be simply taxed away, but must be borrowed from the capitalists in order that interest can be paid on it. The payment of interest on the borrowed capital keeps up the facade that this capital is still productive, i.e., still producing surplus value. The truth behind this fiction is revealed once we realize the state produces no surplus value and, hence, cannot really add to the mass of surplus value.

The MMT school has a description of federal debt that is a smidge closer to an accurate description than the one made by Kurz:

“The Government of the United States offers the functional equivalent of interest-bearing savings accounts to investors, usually wealthy individuals, large corporations, and foreign nations. The savings accounts are usually called US Treasury securities and the sum of their face values is called the debt-subject-to-the-limit; or more colloquially, the national debt, even though comparable savings accounts in banks, are for some reason, not called bank debt.”

First, according to the modern money school then, the state “accepts” the excess capital from capitalist firms, the very wealthiest persons and foreign governments and pays interest  on this capital like a bank; even though treasuries function more like a savings account, it is still referred to as if it is debt. But even the MMT description does not capture the what has taken place: by lending its excess capital to the fascist state, the capitalist class expropriates itself. The mass of capital held by the state in the form of outstanding treasuries never falls — thus it has effectively ceased to be private capital. The capital is now capital held in common by the whole class throughout the entire world market and accrues interest to each capital based on the size of their holdings. On the other hand, the mass of capital held in this form is now completely social and has lost its private character entirely.

Second, the capital exists only notionally as an entry on a ledger or a piece of paper labeled “U.S. treasury”. It has, in fact, ceased to exist at all, since it has been entirely consumed by the state. To grasp the significance of this fact, requires only that we imagine what it would take for Washington to make good on the debt should it not be able to “borrow” additional capital to service its debt. Since the state produces nothing, its only source of payment of its outstanding obligations would be taxes and counterfeiting; thus the state would have to tax capital in order to repay its debts to capitalists, or the state would have to counterfeit dollars on such a scale as to render the currency used to pay its debts worthless. In either case, the effective self-expropriation of capital by the capitalists would be converted into a real expropriation by the state.

The following conclusions can be stated:

First, the state does not borrow capital and then employ it unproductively; rather the capital is already unproductive, i.e., incapable of producing surplus value on its own; and must, therefore, be placed with the state.

Second, the mass of this excess capital never falls and, therefore, the mass of capital at the disposal of the state must always increase.

Third, state debt is not driven by the aims or policies of the state, but by the needs of this excess capital to produce a profit.

Fourth, since this process is determined by a crisis produced by the falling rate of profit, the state must resolve it in a way that adds to the mass of profits, i.e., it takes the form of money loaned to the state on which the state pays interest to the capitalists.

State debt is a mass of excess (entirely superfluous) capital that could not produce profit unless the state borrowed it and paid interest. Thus, the reason the state accumulates debt is not to achieve any policy aim, but to restore profits by converting some definite mass of excess capital into interest-bearing capital. However, unlike industry, the state does not produce commodities and cannot produce the surplus value necessary to pay interest; thus the state’s ability to pay interest on the capital it has unproductively consumed rests on borrowing additional excess capital.

Since the mass of excess capital is constantly increasing within the world market, there is always some mass of capitalists competing to lend their capital to the state. The state does not compete for capital, rather the opposite is the case: capitals compete against each other to lend to the state. If the rate at which the state borrowed the excess capital fell below that required by the mode of production, the competition among capitalists to lend to it would actually intensify — leading to what the bourgeois simpletons call “the flight to safety”; i.e., the phenomenon where the interest the state must pay falls in a crisis.

This phenomenon is already well documented by the simpletons and is the exact opposite of what they assert happens in a crisis. Rather than Washington’s interest rates rising during financial crises, capitalists will even place their capital with Washington at a loss. The loss experienced by capital at negative interest rates is far less than would be experienced should the capital be devalued. The capital is already devalued in fact — i.e., it no longer can produce surplus value and is, therefore, worthless — in a crisis this actual devaluation is threatens to materialize itself in the form of a proportional devaluation in nominal terms.

The less capital Washington borrows and unproductively consumes, the greater the competition among capitals to lend to it, and the lower the rate of interest Washington must pay for this excess capital. It follows from this that unusually low “policy” interest rates as at present is a sign the world market is awash in superfluous capital that must be consumed unproductively through fascist state borrowing, or the mode of production will suffer a massive devaluation event.

On the basis of this and the preceding post, I believe we can now outline how a successful struggle to reduce hours of labor by the working class will affect both capital and he state. I will turn to this next.

6 thoughts on “Superfluous labor and state debt”

  1. From another angle you could view some idealized part of what government does as the provisioning and maintenance of necessary non-producible inputs (such as highways, shipping lanes, commodity workers, and territory reasonably secure from invasion).

    In that view, sophisticated capitalists who are publicly recognized as “deficit hawks” don’t (really) mind perpetual accumulation debt so much as they care that the debt grow no faster than GDP and not be cumulatively “too large” with respect to GDP.

    From their perspective, the problem isn’t that government perpetually soaks up some non-productive capital to provision necessary, non-producible inputs — it’s that the price of those necessary inputs not grow ahead of their own accumulation.

    This way of looking at it helps explain a superficial paradox, namely that the supposedly fiercest deficit hawks, when they hold government power, often grow the debt even more rapidly. They talk as if the debt per se was their big concern when really their concern is that they don’t want gov’t spending on things that they do not think are “necessary non-producible inputs”.

    This also explains, I think, why the supposedly deficit-hawk plutocrats seem to have a very high ideological preference for use-based fees for government services, rather than for general income taxes and property taxes. Politically it is possible to push for fees to match the actual cost of provisioning a non-producible input and that distribute fees more precisely to the direct users of those inputs.

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  2. Jehu: “…by lending its excess capital to the fascist state, the capitalist class expropriates itself. The mass of capital held by the state in the form of outstanding treasuries never falls — thus it has effectively ceased to be private capital. The capital is now capital held in common by the whole class throughout the entire world market and accrues interest to each capital based on the size of their holdings. On the other hand, the mass of capital held in this form is now completely social and has lost its private character entirely.”

    Isn’t this a good thing? Shouldn’t the point be to push the state to spend as much of this social capital on things we all need that we shouldn’t have to pay fees for? Won’t the expenditure of this social capital on necessary non-producible inputs reduce hours of labor? I’m probably missing something.

    Thomas: “In that view, sophisticated capitalists who are publicly recognized as “deficit hawks” don’t (really) mind perpetual accumulation debt so much as they care that the debt grow no faster than GDP and not be cumulatively “too large” with respect to GDP.”

    The MMT theory that Jehu cited contains the argument that the debt-to-GDP ratio argument is entirely political:

    “REAL fiscally responsible policy, if it works generally as expected, creates greater real benefits than real costs for people! It has nothing to do with conforming to some standard simple measure like an acceptable debt-to-GDP ratio that has only a questionable theoretical connection to the actual well-being of people. It is political malpractice to give greater priority to that kind of abstraction than to full employment, price stability, a strong social safety net, and Government programs that will help us solve the many outstanding problems of our nation.”

    Of course, I imagine the point should be full UNemployment, right?

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    1. The MMT theory that Jehu cited contains the argument that the debt-to-GDP ratio argument is entirely political:

      I don’t have a ready cite for you but not, that isn’t quite the MMT position. I think I’ve heard Kelton be a bit clear on this:

      The MMT position is that a higher debt-to-GDP ratio than deficit hawks would like is almost certainly viable. Hey, look at Japan or the US after WWII, they always remind us.

      The MMT position is also that debt levels can be too high.

      We can see from first principles that there must be some upper bound on an acceptable ratio because if debt were very high in relation to GDP, effective interest would consume GDP. Of course, that would be a ridiculously high level of debt.

      In between there are serious dangers to the value of the US’ status as a currency sovereign.

      The reason is that if private reserves are too large relative to GDP, a hostile reserve holder can liquify either to raise US borrowing costs or devalue US currency. In the context of competing currency sovereigns, my guess is that the plutocrats view a hostile devaluing of the currency as the greater threat.

      MMTers sometimes argue that it is unlikely any such hostility would arise. The party attacking the currency would be crushing the value of their own USD reserves, for one thing. For another thing, devaluation of USD would just be terrific for US exports, right?

      What they are glossing over there is mainly oil. If the price of crude in USD skyrockets, US plutocrats are screwed (and US military hegemony is toast).

      Would trashing US fiscal policy like that be too destabilizing for other currency sovereigns to risk it today? Sure. In a decade? I, for one, wouldn’t want to make a firm prediction.

      The simplest way to avoid such geopolitical risks is to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio more modest.

      At this point the MMTers will sometimes remind us that government spending (such as to achieve full employment) can be separated from government borrowing — that as currency sovereign the US is not obligated to maintain a discipline of balance.

      What they are more reluctant to admit is that unbalanced spending — especially progressive spending like a jobs guarantee — will make the problem of too-large-reserves come on that much faster. Jobs-guarantee wages, if just printed up by the US, will rapidly be added to very large reserves then what is to become of them? It is not as if the jobs guarantee will create out of thin air material opportunities for capitalist expansion so this again looks like it could be hugely inflationary.

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  3. Very nearly Thomas the MMT position is that the deficit is endogenous, in that Government does not have control of it. Saving’s desire of the private sector is controlling factor(what Jehu is calling unproductive capital).

    Now it is true that a job guarantee could have an initial inflationary bounce but so what you would only worry about that if you have capital. After that though JG by design turns Phillips curve on it’s head.

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    1. the MMT position is that the deficit is endogenous, in that Government does not have control of it. Saving’s desire of the private sector is controlling factor

      Hmm. That’s not the MMT position as I know it:

      Government policy and savings preference are co-determining factors of the deficit outcome. Neither is individually controlling in the sense of determining precisely what the deficit or surplus will be at the end of a budget year.

      Government fiscal policy isn’t passive with respect to the deficit and MMTers emphasize that a lot. Policy can be meaningfully and effectively aimed at slowing or reversing, or accelerating a deficit or surplus.

      Now it is true that a job guarantee could have an initial inflationary bounce but so what you would only worry about that if you have capital. After that though JG by design turns Phillips curve on it’s head.

      I think a JG would mainly increase consumption by workers. That would be one policy intent of JG and it would be achieved.

      I think this means, upstream on the pipeline of production, that mainly we’d be funding more work at very low wage factories and farms. The amount of oil we directly and indirectly consume would increase.

      Where do the profits from all that go? The new economic activity that generated these particular profits hasn’t created any huge new opportunity to expand capital so I think a lot of it will wind up in financial markets.

      For example: it can be used to buy more key US real estate and jack up rents — currently pretty popular in a few big cities, I gather.

      I’m skeptical that’s good for any segment of the workers involved.

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