Society chose Barbarism and it has its own peculiar political economy

Adam thinks the society I am describing no longer resembles the capitalist mode of production as described by Marx in Capital. He wonders why changes in the monetary system would have such far-reaching changes in how the mode of production operates. And he questions the validity of my reading of Marx’s labor theory:

The implication, Jehu, of what you say is that since April 5, 1933, capitalism has been replaced by a different system of society, an implication which no doubt you accept and which is the basis of your whole approach. But I don’t think it holds water. Society today is still based on the ownership and control of productive resources by rich individuals, corporations and states; production is still carried for sale on a market with a view to making a monetary profit, and is performed by people hired to do the work for a monetary payment. The change in the currency that took place in the USA in 1933 hasn’t altered this basic social fact. And, as a purely monetary change, there is no reason why it should have done. That workers should be paid in tokens for money rather than money itself is not a significant change. Nor was 1933 the first time it had happened.

Has capitalism been replaced by a different system?

Well, yes and no. I think it is pretty clear that we no longer live under the textbook version of capitalism that Marx described in Capital. For several years now I have referred to this different system as fascism and I have argued that it is basically what Luxemburg was talking about when she used the term “barbarism.” Barbarism was not a mere rhetorical device employed by Luxemburg against her social democrat opponents; she was referring to a real impending deep transformation in the political economy of capital.

Marxists never tire of telling us we face a choice between socialism or barbarism. In fact, society made that choice 90 years ago.

Society chose barbarism; we are living with the consequences of that choice.

But what is the political economy of barbarism?

By barbarism (fascism), I am referring to a highly advanced form of capitalism, which has an peculiar political economy that can be precisely described in terms of labor theory. In Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels and Marx predicted that, following the breakdown of production based on exchange value, the state would be forced to undertake the direction of production. This direct management of capitalist accumulation would not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces. Although capitalist private property would be abolished, and the state would become the national capitalist, the proletarians remained wage workers.

The production of surplus value would still take place and that means the employment of labor power remains in place. (How this process takes place without money — without exchange value — still remains for us to explain in detail, but take place it does.) The capitalist class would be rendered entirely superfluous to capitalism. The state, previously the ideal representative of the national capital, becomes its actual personification as well. This event would set the stage for the final resolution of the contradiction: the overthrow of the state.

I believe Luxemburg was referring to the passage from Engels’ book where all of this is detailed when she warned we faced a choice between socialism or barbarism. My only problem with her use of the term barbarism is that she appears to think barbarism represents some sort of economic regression. Engels explicitly called barbarism an economic advance that technically prepares society for communism.

As Adam notes, the idea that the state today is the national capitalist is the whole basis of my approach. Unfortunately, I would bet most communists today still view the state as an arena of class struggle, or worse, through Lassallean goggles, “as an independent entity, an instrument of justice essential for the achievement of the socialist program(Wikipedia); rather than as the direct exploiter of the working class.

This is terribly wrong. The state is our immediate target.

*****

I agree with Adam that workers have always been paid mostly in tokens of money rather than money. But what occurred on April 5, 1933 was not a mere change in the form of money. It was a fundamental alteration in exchange relations themselves. Those relations collapsed and Washington was forced to replace commodity money with a state-issued scrip.

To put this in terms Marx might use, insofar as money serves as means of exchange, the circulation of money is a reflex of the circulation of commodities. As the production of commodities collapsed at the outset of the Great Depression, the circulation of money collapsed with it. Money was removed from circulation by its owners and withdrawn into hoards. This much is documented in the minutes of the United States Federal Reserve Bank during that period.

But when Washington replaced disappearing commodity money with its fiat, this was not a mere replacement of one form of money by another; it was also a change in the content of money relations in two ways: first, the state did not replace a convertible currency with a non-convertible currency; rather, it replaced gold (commodity money) with its non-convertible scrip. When gold was withdrawn from circulation, this was because the requirements of commodity exchange had suddenly and severely contracted as a result of the deep and prolonged crisis. Forcing the non-convertible currency into circulation at this point meant the state was replacing money itself, not convertible currency.

The breakdown of production based on exchange value means, in first place, that money itself was superfluous to the production of material wealth. By forcing its valueless scrip into circulation, the state was engaging in what we today call quantitative easing in an attempt to stoke inflation and drive down real wages.

It should be obvious from this brief discussion that the value represented by this scrip is determined by the requirements of capitalist production for profit and not by the requirements of commodity exchange as currency had been previously. The state can alter the peg at will or remove the peg entirely, as it eventually did in 1971, to meet the requirements of capitalist accumulation. This what changed: the state manages the process of accumulation through its fiscal and monetary policies.

64 thoughts on “Society chose Barbarism and it has its own peculiar political economy”

  1. The phrase “socialism or barbarism” is originally Marx’s own, according to Kautsky.

    But to your dispute with Adam – you know that the SPGB has a long history, and so in the past they have criticized various “theories of collapse” of capitalism (not to throw your position together with all the rest, but there are similarities). For instance, I’m sure they have criticized the theory of Herman Cahn, a now forgotten Marxist theorist, who argued for the collapse of capitalism due to contradictions inherent to money, already before and during WWI, in his works: ‘Capital to-day; a study of recent economic development’ (1918 edition); ‘The collapse of capitalism’ (1919). Both are online on archive.org, if you’re interested. The precise dating of the change (whether 1907, 1914, 1933 etc.) should in my opinion not be that essential.


    You say that “Money was removed from circulation by its owners and withdrawn into hoards. This much is documented in the minutes of the United States Federal Reserve Bank during that period.”

    ^
    I don’t know if this formulation refers to, for instance, the withdrawal specifically of gold coins from circulation in early 1933 (or since 1929). We should be precise on little facts like this. The total “money” (including notes) apparently greatly increased during this period. Also, can we simply equate the withdrawal of money from banks(/treasury) with withdrawal of money from circulation,? I’m fine with doing so, but it’s not evident for everyone; some would say that money in the bank is already “hoarded”, and withdrawing it puts it into circulation. Another issue, how much actual American capitalists were “hoarding” gold in the US, when there was also the (arguably larger) problem of export of gold abroad.

    I also recall Marx’s point that people hoard/accumulate gold in times of prosperity (and dishoard gold in times of depression, by necessity). You’ll say maybe this is not true for acute moments of crisis, when commodities are dumped and money sought after, but concretely in the 2008 (and 2010) acute moments of crisis it turns out that gold was used by banks and central banks (eg Sweden) as collateral to secure dollars. This was taken as evidence that for the players that matter (like the Bank of England or the BIS), gold is still the best collateral. In that sense, they “hoarded” gold, and engaged in QE. In fact, in the past for a normal bank to “hoard” gold is at the same time to emit a note into circulation.

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  2. Noa is correct. The SPGB did criticise Herman Cahn’s 1919 book “The Collapse of Capitalism” as, for instance here, from 1922:

    https://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/socialist-standard/1920s/1922/no-219-november-1922/correspondence-collapse-capitalism/

    Mention of Cahn’s book prompted me to look at it again and in particular chapter III on “The Fatal Flaw of Capitalism”. I was surprised to see that he anticipated Jehu. After stating that “money” was synonymous with “gold”, he wrote:

    “On the existence of money depends the existence of capitalism. The conditions presented by gold are absolutely vital to its life. One valuable product, representing social labor time, is necessary as an equivalent which confirms the uncontrolled private producers the social validity of their individual labor time. When it becomes impossible any longer to conform to this necessity, then the category of money breaks down and not a vestige of capitalism can survive a day.”

    However, he was rather more optimistic than Jehu, writing:

    “When the category of money is destroyed through the operation of some economic law, the commodity-producing society and its organic form, the political state, disappear at once, and Socialism, organized industrially, arises spontaneously

    If only.

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  3. Why not simply call it “state capitalism”, then? That would be much better than “fascism”, a description that’s inappropriate historically. Not that we’re there (the sort of state capitalism Engels envisaged) either.

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    1. Yeah, I get a lot of push back on that terminology, as you can imagine. I was almost convinced by the fierce opposition to the term until it dawned on me that Luxemburg essentially predicted the same thing but called it barbarism. But the topper was when I read this essay by Paul Mattick from 1941:

      https://www.marxists.org/archive/mattick-paul/1941/new-order.htm

      Mattick, a catastrophist who agreed with Grossman’s analysis, basically predicted fascism was going to be a permanent fixture of bourgeois society.

      Also, sellouts like Angela Davis and Noam Chomsky can get away with calling on people to vote for “state capitalist” politicians like Clinton. They would have a harder time calling on people to vote for “fascists like Clinton.”

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      1. Your disagreement with Adam isn’t just about terminology, is it though? And it was Bukharin, not Mattick, who is first credited with the theory of state capitalism, also called “organized capitalism” (a theory rejected as social-reformist/fascist by the communists). Nor is it a matter of periodization of capitalism as such, since there are plenty of such theories of a new phase/stage (from Lenin onward), that don’t claim an immediate collapse will happen. If it were just a matter of calling Clinton a fascist, then we’re free to do that even without particular Marxist analysis: for example Jonah Goldberg’s book on liberal fascism.

        (To digress a bit, let me repeat my point, that the post-1971 free flotation of currency exchange rates, the point of the definitive floating of the “gold-price”, is greeted as liberalization from the state, as liberalization from the state-monopoly or involvement in setting the exchange-rate/”price of the commodity gold”, by people like Krugman iirc. So contrary to the libertarians, a “gold standard” is seen by them as a state-monopoly policy, distorting market forces in determining the “price” of currency/gold.)

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      2. I don’t mean to imply it was ever about terminology. Behind the criticism of my use of the term fascism is the Lassallean prejudice toward the bourgeois state as the readymade instrument for emancipation of the working class. As to the etymology of the terms, I am thankfully unaware, having come to my conclusion independently. I don’t know who Goldberg is, nor have I read his book. I was led to the conclusion that American liberalism is a variant of fascism by studying the genesis of the cold war to discover why hours of labor were never reduced after the Great Depression. The parallels with prewar Nazi Germany are too obvious to ignore.

        Finally, contrary to those who say debased fiat currency emancipated society from the state, the actual reaction was much more that this currency emancipated the state from society — as MMT insists almost in so many words. The monetary sovereign faces no hard financial constraint on its expenditures, i.e., no real monetary limit on its access to the wealth of society.

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  4. It seems you’re trying this polemical maneuver where you oppose MMT politically (as fascist), but give them analytical props for the current “neoliberal” situation. But again (as I explained before), a state paper money, a forced currency as properly understood by some English political economists and Marx following them, doesn’t have to rely on the bond market (“society”) to raise money, as is still the situation today. MMT (or whatever they call themselves) politically opposes the current reliance on debt market, that is, they don’t see the current neoliberal situation as a realization of their agenda of state paper money. Forced state paper money is when the government simply prints/expends money, on paying its soldiers, bureaucrats, etc. The so-called “trillion-dollar coin” is a proposal for such a forced currency (based on the technicality in US law that the US Treasury is responsible for coins, whereas the Fed is for notes). Treasury bond market isn’t some detail of today’s capitalism. But, suppose you’ll disagree, as you’re likely to do, then you have to argue that, basically, government bonds themselves really act as if they are money today. The fact remains that to issue them, someone in the market/society has to be first willing to buy them. Even if the central banks buy them in turn, it goes first through the market. If you think the central bank is the sole reason for propping up the US Treasury market, then there would be no need (in order to prop up the dollar) for foreign countries/investors to buy Treasuries. And the US government wouldn’t need to worry about China (or whoever) dumping its Treasuries.

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    1. Noa, let me clarify a possible misconception on your part: I don’t give MMT analytical props DESPITE characterizing them as fascist, I give them analytical props BECAUSE they are fascist, i.e., because they openly admit they are solely concerned with power the fascist state has, since 1971, to appropriate the wealth of society without constraint. It is not just that the state doesn’t have to rely on the bond market to raise money, the survival of capital now requires the state spend without the constraints imposed by the bond market. MMT is not about the valueless scrip the state issues to its vendor, pensioners or soldiers to pay for their “goods and services”, it is about the huge mass of excess capital that must be absorbed by the state unproductively if production for profit is to continue. It is important not to look at the worthless scrip Washington issues, but to look as the commodities purchased with the worthless scrip Washington issues and ask yourself who is going to buy all of those Chinese unsold goods at an average profit if the US doesn’t?

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      1. You can’t give them props for an analysis which they don’t have. The MMTers (/post-Keynesians/etc.) bemoan the loss of power of the state since 1971, since neo-liberalism; be it the abandonment of capital controls, deregulation, financialization, the rise of speculation and credit/debt slavery, reliance on the debt market especially by poor countries, and so on. That’s their analysis. As a consequence, their agenda for the state(s) is to increase its power (over the speculators, or whatever), via the introduction of state paper money (which doesn’t have to rely on the bond market). By the way, in history there have been convertible forced state moneys (eg the Prussian thaler was convertible in silver, and a similar argument can be made for the Tsarist gold-convertible ruble before WWI), so MMT’s proposal wouldn’t even be incompatible with a “gold standard”. You object to me, that the state’s expenses aren’t used by the state itself (as in the past, eg to fight its wars – though there are in addition the state’s social programs), but rather has the function to support the economy by buying up excess production, and so help the economy stay alive. That’s the hope or selling point of MMT/Keynesians for their political agenda, but it is not the reality at present. Even if the US government were for some reason worried about the problem of unsold Chinese goods, it doesn’t buy them itself, but US companies (Walmart), or US “society” does.
        If you were right, then the MMTers would be happy about the present situation, but patently they’re not, rather they’re enraged, frothing at the mouth (pretty much like fascists). My point with the example of Chinese bondholders is, that there are plenty of bondholders who are not the Fed. Their behavior is not under the control of the American government (as some say the Fed is). The Fed itself isn’t all-powerful, it can prop up the stock market, by buying QE, but that’s not buying actual goods, and it doesn’t prop up the actual profit-rate of capital, or does it? Anyway, I don’t think the MMTers would agree with you on that.

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  5. @jehu
    I have read a lot of this discussion and I wonder about something. 97% of the “money” in the world is “credit money”, money created by loans, by the creation of debt. You fixate on fiat, but fiat currency is only 3% of what passes as money. If 97% of the world’s money is predicated on debt, what is the value of labor power or of commodities?

    If all of the debt was paid off, does that mean that we would lose 97% of the world’s “money” supply? What does that say about the problem of the valorization of value? If 97% of the world’s money supply is debt which cannot be repaid or that money would be destroyed, what of the value of commodities? I rather like Fred Moseley’s book because he takes Marx’s work to be a monetary theory of value without falling into the Samual Bailey-ism of Value-Form Theory in which Value is produced in exchange, but I think he believes that the valorization of value is continuing to take place, when in fact it is being put off indefinitely. Maybe this is because, as you say, that it is not possible. Maybe it is not so much fiat money of the U.S., but debt money, that points to this dilemma of an infinite holding off of realization.

    Or I suppose we could look at it another way: what is the proportion of wages paid for unproductive labor, that is, for labor power which produces nothing? I don’t mean here the stupidity of cretins who think that programmers don’t produce anything because computer programs are not “material” things. If a program runs a process that controls something else, just because you can’t hold it doesn’t mean it isn’t real. In fact, no one can hold any labor power at all and it is the ur-commodity. After all, Marx made the point more than once that the labor of a clown produces value, and therefore surplus-value, if the clown’s labor power, their capacity to clown, is itself sold as a commodity for a wage (for money) to a capitalist who employs many clowns and runs a clown service. It is the transformation of clowning into labor, into a moment of capital, that means the clown is selling their labor power instead of providing a person service. That a program can be copied infinitely is not to the advantage of Microsoft, by the way, since they must sell a very large number of copies to make up for the labor power paid for the creation of such applications, and then in an ongoing fashion, for the patching, upgrading, and support of such applications. It is funny how an enormous ignorance of a modern industry is passed off as “Marxist”.

    No, I mean the labor power that doesn’t produce a commodity for sale; thing or service or “immaterial” thing does not matter. What about the vast number of people employed in selling, buying, moving things about, arguing over contracts, creating hedges, performing legal work, etc? And of those who services which are productive, what are the margins of their productivity? For most, it is exceedingly narrow, especially compared to the FIRE “industries” of modern finance.

    Just some thoughts.

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    1. I don’t have much to say on this and need some time to think about it, but one thing stands out: this sounds pretty much like the relation between credit money and gold under the gold standard. It adds to my intuition that the fiat dollar did not replace convertible currency, but replaced gold. Credit “money” in this case would be tied to fiat as opposed to a commodity. Could we even call it money now? What would we call it? Fictitious credit? I hesitate to spout off on this without considering the ramifications.

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    1. The only debt that qualifies as debt that cannot be paid is debt incurred by the US government. And even here it only applies with regards to the total mass of the debt. Individual bonds will of course be paid off, but these bonds will be replaced by new bonds that may even exceed the value of the paid off bonds. The result is that the total mass of debt will never fall, but increases constantly. If this does not happen, it is likely a catastrophe will occur.

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      1. Wright’s claim was, that ‘97% of the world’s money supply is debt which cannot be repaid or that money would be destroyed’. Adam took this to be a reference to bank deposits (or M2). Wright’s claim implies that if you borrow money from your bank, expend it, and when the time comes, repay your loan to the bank, what happened was that first your bank created money out of nothing and at the conclusion the repaid money to the bank simply ‘is destroyed’ (as if it never existed). That’s a popular (false) theory (eg held by Graeber), and Adam’s useful link debunks that theory. You, however, bring up US government debt. In that case, when the US repays individual bonds, likewise, no money ‘is destroyed’ (leaving aside the case if the bondholder happens to be the Fed). It’s in fact possible to reduce total US government debt, as happened under Rubin in the late 90s under William Clinton. Whether it’s possible to reduce it to zero is a bit of an academic question (though interesting in itsself), since from the dawn of capitalism there has existed state debt.

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      2. Yes. And it ended in disaster if you recall. The world economy entered a depression from which it has yet to exit.

        Why do you think Cheney remarked that deficits don’t matter, even as Bernanke gave a rather dramatic talk explaining that the Federal Reserve was prepared to pursue QE if necessary to prevent outright deflation? The attempt to balance the budget was catastrophic. I didn’t just invent that out of my head. Just to prove how stupid they are, Pelosi and company did it again in 2006, triggering the 2008 gfc.

        It amazes me that Marxists have such short memories. There is like only one guy in Australia who seems to have figured this out. The rest of you are clueless.

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  6. There has been a continuous catastrophe, or barbarism, since over a century. I’m not convinced the government debt reduction under Clinton in the late 90s played much of a role in it, let alone worsen it. I recalled Marxist author Herman Cahn, who made the claim about inevitably ballooning debt (bank deposits) leading to catastrophe, a 100 years ago to this day (based on analysis before WWI), check him out if you’re interested. It was not a specifically new theory though. Hilferding, in his Finance Capital (ch. 2), already mocked those economists who “are left in a state of superstitious panic by an inconvertible government paper certificate, and even by the most harmless small convertible bank note. Goliaths, though not in theory, they fear David; and the smaller the bank note, the greater is their panic.”

    His reference to a harmless small banknote (ie a debt, credit-money) I think refers to the critique made against the Currency School, which drove their reasoning ad absurdum: even a single banknote is enough to destroy the money system (“gold standard”). Suppose total US government debt is only $1. This $1 US bond must be paid off (let’s suppose here in gold) constantly, ever again – whenever it is paid off, a new 1$ bond is issued by the state. Suppose the Treasury owns $10 billion worth of gold. Each time it pays off the bond, it has $1 of gold less in its reserves. If this continues the reserves in the end will be drained, and so a 1$ US bond can destroy $10 billion of gold reserves, without even an increase in total outstanding government debt.

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    1. I suppose so. The funny thing is no one even realizes a depression took place beginning in 2001, nor that it still continues today. Much less its connection to the Clinton-Gingrich balanced budget. So far as I know, I am the only person who has identified it. You can only see it when prices are denominated in gold, (which almost no one does). But if you switch to gold from dollars, it will be unmistakable. Hilferding has no relevance to this discussion, of course.

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      1. A recession took place in the early 2000s (there’s a wikipedia-entry on it), but, correct me if I’m wrong, this is the first time I see you blame it on the reduction in total US government debt in the late 90s. Maybe that’s what MMTers or Keynesians would say, and if that’s case, I would still not buy their claim just on their say so. It does however show that Rubin under Clinton wasn’t an MMTer, and, by your definition, in the late 90s, US policy and economy couldn’t be called (state-)fascist during these few years. If you do, then the definition is unfalsifiable, since it encompasses both an expansion and a reduction in total US government debt.

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      2. No. Fed policy is already determined by the fact that production based on exchange value has collapsed and capitalism cannot survive without intervention by the fascist state. Now, it is plain that people are stupid. They may think they can pursue whatever policy they want. They may even tell us policy is contingent. For ideological purposes or to make cheap political points, they may pursue policies diametrically opposed to those required by the capitalist mode of production. But then they find themselves running around with their hair on fire as the largest financial houses in the world market collapse into ruin before their eyes and one national economy after another descends into chaos. As I said, people are stupid. Who knows why they do these things. Yet the mode of production makes its requirements felt.

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      3. Central banks still hoard gold and their recent intake (largest since 1967) suggest they consider it money — even after decades of dollar depreciation. What it looks like today, after decades of exploiting the world’s population, is a reversion from Washington’s extremely privileged post-WWII position.

        There was a collapse in the 1930’s. But like all crises it appears to have unfortunately recovered and expanded beyond planetary limits due to the centralization of the money supply.

        https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-full-year-2018/central-banks-and-other-institutions

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  7. Hilferding may not have had anything to say about government debt (the so-called “national” debt) but he had something very relevant (and very detailed)to say about convertible and inconvertible currencies and what happens when convertibility is suspended or introduced, when there’s a “legal tender paper money” and “under a system of pure paper currency”.. This was in relation to the situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire where the money-commodity was silver rather than gold. See chapter 2 of his “Finance Capital”:

    https://www.marxists.org/archive/hilferding/1910/finkap/ch02.htm

    There is not all that much new under the Sun.

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  8. “Stop being silly, Noa. The character of the state doesn’t depend on the policies of a single administration.”

    It’s an exception, which you claim proves the rule. Now, if it is so clear, then it should be piece of cake for you to prove that the total government debt reduction of a single administration caused a catastrophic depression, that “still continues today”.

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    1. Yes, I have, Noa.

      Here, based on Larry Summers work, is the collapse of GDP as denominated in gold showing three depressions in 1929, 1971 and 2001: https://therealmovement.wordpress.com/2013/07/30/how-larry-summers-proved-marx-was-right-about-everything-and-why-this-is-not-necessarily-good-news/

      And here is similar data presented in relation to the Marxist economist, Michael Roberts work: https://therealmovement.wordpress.com/2013/11/09/some-thoughts-on-michael-roberts-north-star-essay-on-the-crisis/

      You might also want to read this series on the sudden conversion of Clinton deficit reduction team to the benefits of deficits: https://therealmovement.wordpress.com/2013/11/01/everything-you-think-you-know-about-fascist-state-deficit-spending-is-wrong/

      I actually spend a lot of time providing empirical proof for my thesis. Empirical proof that it should be easy to falsify, if it were possible. The empirical evidence is all in gold, of course — which all “sober-minded” people dismiss. (Not that this matters to me.)

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      1. Thanks Jehu. Happy to learn to you had this view already in 2013: “As the chart [of the state expenditures as a share of total GDP] shows, state spending as a share of GDP was rising more or less smoothly since the Great Depression until 1990. Beginning with around 1990, suddenly the state’s share of GDP began falling and continued to fall until 2001. […] the attempt to constrain the growth of the state’s share is correlated with the peak in profits in 1997 and a subsequent onset of depression. […] Ultimately the cause of the financial crisis of 2008 was attempts to constrain the expansion of the state’s share of GDP.”

        A few remarks:

        – in this discussion we were talking about total US government debt, not about the annual state expenditures (which if state revenues rise, can also rise without increasing total government debt). Looking at the chart of total federal debt as % of GDP, we see a different picture: a steady decline (!) for the whole period from 1945 to 1980. Thereafter, in the period of supposed neoliberal austerity, a rise up to 1995. After 1995, in the late Clinton era, a dip to 2000 (in your state expenditure chart, the dip begins a bit earlier, already in 1990), and a flat-line until it picks up again after 2008.

        – In addition, whatever charts we use (whether annual state expenditure, or total government debt as % of GDP), shouldn’t we also convert them first into gold ounces, or is this a silly question? That’s what you did for GDP, so it would only be consistent to also do it for the chart of total federal debt (or annual state expenditure) as % of GDP. Would we still see a decrease in the 90s of the %?

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      2. To your first question: Yes. It does rise faster than government debt. But not a decline in government debt. This is because the US national capital is expanding during the period. The expansion likely led Clinton and Gingrich to believe the budget could be balanced without difficulty.

        To your second question: Yes, again. I probably have it somewhere in another post. If I did not, it is a hole that must be filled. But you are correct that all figures need to be rendered in terms of real exchange values.

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  9. I think my second remark was silly: the evolution of the % will be the same, whether the charts are in ounces of gold or in dollars.

    As to the first point, to be clear, I’m suggesting you should (also based on the discussion here) look instead at a chart of total federal debt as % of GDP (that is, look at total federal debt, not state expenditures – given the fact, that, as I explained, if state revenues simultaneously rise, there is no total debt increase). And when you look up that chart, you see a steady decline of the % from 1945 to 1980; but in your classification, this is a period (and not just a single administration) already in the middle of state fascism; in other words, how can it be that we have a rising GDP during this period (or even if we take your chart of GDP in gold terms, from 1945 to 1970), when the total debt as % of GDP is steadily falling (until 1980)?
    (Leaving aside potentially several issues, like with the very concept of GDP, as absolute figure or as annual growth rate.)

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      1. It’s just the spitballing approach. It’s true though, that I haven’t yet seen any chart which shows the evolution of national debt (or state expenditures) converted in terms of gold ounces. In periods when the gold “price” rises, then such a chart could probably even show a decline of state debt/expenditures (eg in the 1970-1980 period, and the 2000-2011 period).

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      2. Definitely true. The silliest thing is to constrain state spending in a downturn as these dumbasses keep doing. But there is no accounting for people who actually drink their own koolaid.

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  10. A note on my point re: credit/debt money.

    Firstly, the association with Graeber is wrong. You of course have no way to know that. Graeber has a theory of money, regardless of the society or historical period, as based on debt/credit. IMO, this is nonsense. Money qua capital, or money as we know it, is all that matters here, and the money Marx is concerned with is not merely the means of exchange or measure of value, but the necessary form of appearance of value itself.

    Secondly, there is no doubt that credit/debt money created by bank loans today far exceeds reserves and state “hard cash” fiat, and is also not convertible into any form of commodity-money (gold, silver, whatever it might be.) Further, the growth of this money has been dramatic since the final end of the gold standard. Britain reached 1 trillion pounds in the 90’s and that number increased to 2 trillion in the last few years.

    The way this is managed is the massive extension of debt at all levels of the economy: household debt, corporate debt, and state debt. Banks create “money” (I keep putting money in quotes because in fact it isn’t money, it is a ponzi scheme of debt that capital has had recourse to as a result of the crisis of valorization.”) by extending loans.

    I suggested that this is debt that cannot be paid back without eliminating part of the money supply because, unmoored from any commodity-money, it is created the way debt/credit money people think it is, much as the Modern Monetary Theory folks are wrong about money in theory, but at least in relation to the dollar, in the U.S., now, they are quite accurate. If a portion of the modern money supply is a function of debt, then the elimination of debt will eliminate a portion of the money supply, even taking into account the velocity of the amount in circulation.

    By focusing only on fiat, Jehu underestimates the scope of the situation.

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    1. Wright wrote: “Firstly, the association with Graeber is wrong. You of course have no way to know that.”

      The association is right. For example Adam already dealt with Graeber’s claim a couple of years ago.

      “Graeber has a theory of money, regardless of the society or historical period, as based on debt/credit. IMO, this is nonsense.”

      IIRC Graeber in his ‘Debt’ actually made a periodization of history by forms of money, and his supposed previous period, ending for him in 1971, fell under the domination of metal money. He does follow Hudson (et al.) in regarding credit money as the original form. For a critique of this, see incidentally Dennis Flynn’s ‘Six Monetary Functions over Five Millennia: A Price Theory of Monies’.

      “Secondly, there is no doubt that credit/debt money created by bank loans today far exceeds reserves and state “hard cash” fiat, and is also not convertible into any form of commodity-money (gold, silver, whatever it might be.)”

      The figure of bank deposit accounts has always exceeded central bank notes, not just today. See Herman Cahn’s books from a 100 years ago, which I referenced above.

      “Banks create “money” (I keep putting money in quotes because in fact it isn’t money, it is a ponzi scheme of debt that capital has had recourse to as a result of the crisis of valorization.”) by extending loans.”

      No, they don’t “create” money. Please make an effort to read the critique that Adam suggested to you earlier.

      “this is debt that cannot be paid back without eliminating part of the money supply”

      To repay a debt, eliminates that debt. The money that repaid that debt still exists after it was used to repay the debt, but total debt decreased. It’s as simple as that. Now there are some cranks who object as follows (and maybe you, Wright, share a similar idea): “Problem: the principle of the loan is injected into the money supply. The interest isn’t. There is always a shortfall in the money supply to pay back the debt. Debt has to continually increase to pay back the interest. It’s a dog chasing it’s tail.”

      It’s easy to see here that Marx’s notion of the inherent drive of capital accumulation gets replaced by a notion of compulsion of debt slavery. Let’s immediately take the situation when the holder of the debt is the central bank. On repayment its matured assets are deleted from its balance sheet, and most of the money (the returned principal) is deleted. But the Fed’s profit on matured assets is not deleted. It is again put in circulation (namely handed over to the Treasury and put into circulation by the Treasury, in payment of actual goods or salaries), and this happens without increasing the debt. So there is no “dog chasing its tail”. There always has to exist some other debt (ie non-matured assets on the Fed’s balance sheet, eg the $11 billion of gold certificates, which are a permanent debt of the US government to the Fed). It’s what banks do, or there would be no bank-notes.

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  11. Speaking of cranks…

    “The figure of bank deposit accounts has always exceeded central bank notes, not just today. See Herman Cahn’s books from a 100 years ago, which I referenced above.”

    I never denied that. Bank deposit accounts are of course a long-standing thing. The only issue is what happens when the “money” exchanged is no longer actually commodity-money and when those bank deposit accounts grow exponentially relative to their previous relative amount.

    My point focuses on the problem of what happens to exchange when there is no exchange of equivalents, when the form of value (exchange-value) is not an actual commodity, but not simply from fiat but the broad money as a whole. On this, I think that Jehu is correct to point out that this is an indication of a crisis of valorization of value. It isn’t as if the form of wealth has ceased to be value in Marx’s sense, but the equivalent itself is no longer a commodity. To what extent is valorization actually taking place?

    Now, John Weeks makes an argument, interesting in itself, that for fiat and even credit money to function as money, there only needs to be a hoard of commodity-money, even if it is not in circulation and this is why the U.S. and other countries continue to maintain hoards of gold (rory pointed to a similar idea above). However, if this is true, then a valuation of production in gold would likely indicate in rather stark terms the crisis of valorization and the threat would not be inflation, but deflation. Jehu has provided a number of articles on the empirical aspects of this in the past.

    Having read 3 chapters of the tract you and Adam assigned to me, all I can see is that you not only haven’t taken seriously any of the Marxian scholarship on the problem of the last 40 years or so, but your reading is wholly a Ricardian reading of Marx. Whatever Jehu makes of Moseley, for example, at least Moseley in Money and Totality takes seriously the centrality of the money-form. Moseley’s own book makes a solid case that actual money has to be a commodity to function as universal equivalent, as the form of exchange-value, and he recognizes that even if he thinks fiat or credit money or any non-commodity money can be accepted “as if” it were money, he by no means feels that he has an adequate conceptualization of how this is so. The discussion, insofar as it remains on a largely empirical level, begs the completely different notion of money and value from people who work out from Postone, Robert Kurz, et al. against those who are traditional neo-Ricardians masquerading as Marxians.

    The necessity of debt and the massive expansion of financial instruments is a sign of deferred valorization, of the problem of the valorization or realization of value produced, but also of the decreasing mass of value due to the decreasing share, absolutely and relatively, of living labor in production. My suggestion is that, in only focusing on the state, Jehu is short-changing the degree to which this is also reflected in and sustained by contemporary post-1971 finance and private debt.

    It is not capital accumulation vs. debt slavery, but debt slavery as form of appearance of a crisis of capital accumulation.

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  12. Wright writes:

    “The only issue is what happens when the “money” exchanged is no longer actually commodity-money and when those bank deposit accounts grow exponentially relative to their previous relative amount.”

    There was “exponential” growth of bank deposit accounts in the past too. You mentioned some big figures, but you have to determine whether the growth rate was anything different from the past. Also remember in the past (in Marx’s time) the most common form of credit money was the bill of exchange (or bank acceptance), which we aren’t used to any longer (except perhaps in a place like China, where its called shadow banking or some much name). Already in the 17th century iirc, only 5% of international trade was settled in actual metal money. Indeed a proper operation of a “gold standard” sees no use of actual gold (only when the gold points are violated does it move hands).

    “My point focuses on the problem of what happens to exchange when there is no exchange of equivalents, when the form of value (exchange-value) is not an actual commodity, but not simply from fiat but the broad money as a whole”

    The understanding, which you seem to share, namely the theory of private money creation, is incorrect (as criticized eg in Adam’s link). I doubt your point was merely to say that payments are made via bank deposit transfers, since that happened in the past too (in “exponential” fashion).

    “your reading is wholly a Ricardian reading of Marx. […] at least Moseley in Money and Totality takes seriously the centrality of the money-form.”

    A bit of conflating here between the kinds of money, with the form of value (which is ultimately the universal equivalent) as such. In any case, again, the problem is not that you want to focus on credit money (in conditions of inconvertibility), but that you appear to misunderstand it, as something radically new.

    “Moseley […] thinks fiat or credit money or any non-commodity money can be accepted “as if” it were money, he by no means feels that he has an adequate conceptualization of how this is so. The discussion, insofar as it remains on a largely empirical level, begs the completely different notion of money and value from people who work out from Postone, Robert Kurz, et al. against those who are traditional neo-Ricardians masquerading as Marxians.”

    We should start by formulating the questions adequately, or else you end up crediting various monetary cranks (often fascists) with insights, that the old-time Marxists supposedly are too stubborn to see. Also, in my view the discussion has not even reached the empirical level yet. Take a look at the actual operation of central bank payment systems. For example in the US the biggest change probably this decade was the shift from intra-day credit to use of excess reserves (due to QE). This shift was possibly already underway before 2008 and it looks like this type of payment via excess reserves will be maintained, justified as being safest (the +$500 billion reduction of the Fed’s balance sheet ending this September).


    FYI, I refer to a debate in the (Korea-based) journal MARXISM 21 (free access http://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/index.kci Select the Search Field as Journal Title, enter MARXISM 21 in the Search Keyword), between Chang Keun Kim on one hand, and Freeman/Kliman on the other. Moseley also wrote a paper for it:

    ‘The MELT and Circular Reasoning in the New Interpretation and the Temporal Single System Interpretation’, Fred Moseley, Vol.13 No.2, [2016]

    ‘Circular Reasoning in Freeman and Kliman’s (TSSI) Interpretation of the MELT’, Changkeun Kim, Vol.13 No.3, [2016]

    ‘A Note on Causation, Logical Implication, and the Ordering of Variables in Equations’, Alan Freeman, Andrew Kliman, Vol.13 No.4, [2016]

    ‘Freeman and Kliman’s Formal Logic versus Marx’s Causal Logic’, Changkeun Kim, Vol.14 No.1, [2017]

    Kim also announced a forthcoming article on inconvertible paper money, but unfortunately it hasn’t appeared yet (and doesn’t look like it will).

    Kim criticises the circular reasoning of Freeman/Kliman’s concept of MELT. This is much like the early Marxist critique of Hilferding’s concept of ‘socially-necessary circulation value’, indeed Kim referenced the translation of Kautsky’s 1912 critique of Hilferding in his previous paper (in Korean): ‘The Implications and Limits of Hilferding’s Finance Capital for Understanding of Contemporary Capitalism’, Chang Keun Kim, MARXISM 21 / 2012 / v.9, no.1, 202-244.

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  13. A quick remark heading into the next post.

    If production on the basis of exchange-value has collapsed, it can’t be due to a collapse of labour-time necessary to extract gold. If anything, mining may have become more exploitative and expansive over time. I don’t know if Jehu’s argument factors this in, or if it even requires this point at all.

    See “Labour time in South African gold mins: 1886-2006” by Paul Finlay Stewart (2012).

    There is also this timely Reuter’s exclusive:

    “Exclusive: Gold worth billions smuggled out of Africa”
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gold-africa-smuggling-exclusive/exclusive-gold-worth-billions-smuggled-out-of-africa-idUSKCN1S00IT

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  14. Chris , you wrote:

    “Having read 3 chapters of the tract you and Adam assigned to me, all I can see is that you not only haven’t taken seriously any of the Marxian scholarship on the problem of the last 40 years or so, but your reading is wholly a Ricardian reading of Marx.”

    What are you saying was Ricardo’s theory of banking and money? Since he had been a practical banker himself it can’t have been that banks can “create money out of thin air” as he would have known that that was nonsense. Even so, he made a mistake with his quantity theory of convertible currency and the price level; which the tract certainly doesn’t endorse (and which Marx pointed out only held when there was an inconvertible currency).

    If you define bank loans as “money” then by definition banks create it, but that gets us nowhere as you still have to explain where the banks get what they lend. It doesn’t necessarily follow that it’s from thin air created by the stroke of a pen as a book debt. In fact it does follow at all. It comes of course from what the banks have themselves borrowed. The role of banks in a capitalist economy is essentially to collect unused savings and channel them to capitalists to invest productively. They are financial intermediaries not money-creators.

    I must say that I find it strange that there are “Marxian scholars” who are looking for some monetary flaw in capitalism rather than at actual production and production relations.

    Incidentally, chapter 7 of that tract does have something to say about the substitution of tokens for the actual money-commodity and even for fiat money in the act of exchange:

    https://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/pamphlet/the-magic-money-myth/#7

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  15. A different form of the same (more or less, I hope) argument Jehu makes. Crude citations included. I conclude with an environmental observation:

    Capital in general presupposes capital which at first glance appears as circular reasoning. The seeming paradox at the origins of capital is resolved by identifying the various forms of primitive accumulation (i.e. the last part of Capital v1). By implication, surplus value presupposes surplus value. Proletarianism presupposes proletarianism. Before money and commodities become capital, there must be an accumulation which, through a kind of speculative expenditure on force, establishes the social relations necessary for Capital to self-expand.

    Similarly, the more surplus that has accumulated in a society, the more the society as a whole can see invested in speculative capital — e.g. in new constant capital. The pre-existing surplus real wealth is necessary so that the society’s social system can afford to wait until the new constant capital begins to return additional surplus of its own. (This is discussed in the fragment on machines.)

    The wealthier a capitalist society is, the longer it can postpone the realization of investment in new capital. However, there is a limit beyond which investment in new capital can not be realized without the action of countervailing tendencies (such as, say, the violent destruction of capital). When the delay in realization of new (speculative) capital begins to *reduce* surplus, crisis occurs, triggering counter-measures and reconfigurations. (This describes (in part) the problem of absolute over-accumulation discussed in v3.)

    Countervailing tendencies, however, leave the general knowledge of society intact and so they also preserve a high lower bound on the organic composition of capital. Thus, even as readjustment occurs, it can only intensify the problem and, overall, the degree of crisis grows over time and/or the time between manifest crises shortens. (This follows from the argument in v3.)

    To escape a perpetual worsening and accelerating cycle of crises, production of surplus value on the basis of exchange must break down – and the state must more or less direct the production of surplus by authority. (The Fragment and Socialism: Utopian and Scientific).

    Initially, the state can direct production by debasing its currency and injecting non-productive demand – buying economic output while itself producing nothing. One effect of this is an increase in relative surplus value (a devaluation of wages). Another effect of this is that while the state consumes non-productively, it gains state-controlled use-values which it can use to force / manage the reconfiguration of capitalist society through activities such as war or constructing highways to stimulate the production of suburbs. (e.g. Keynes’ General Theory).

    Such direction from the state does not stop the rise in the organic composition of capital (it accelerates it). At a certain point, it becomes practically impossible for the employment of new labor to outpace the economizing on labor. At that point, the Keynsian mechanism breaks down. (e.g. Keynes’ As Our Grandchildren….)

    For capitalist relations to continue further, labor must be increasingly superfluous meaning speculative investment in “new capital” that can *never* be realized. (Fragment). Since superfluous labor power produces no value, when it becomes a large or even majority share of labor power generally, the value of labor power falls rapidly to 0. The currency that cycles to maintain that production, likewise, no longer has value. At this point, the stage is set for an abundant society that requires only setting aside capitalist social relations entirely – and the knowledge that this is possible becomes increasingly apparent. (Marx and Engels, repeatedly.)

    Such a permanent crisis of realization of new capital may, however, be disguised by forcing all circulation to use a truly 0 value currency. (Nixon, Postone). Through regulation and bureaucracy, the state’s pseudo-keynsian demand no longer even has buy real commodities — it can simply, forcibly, suppress the productivity of labor. (Graeber – bullshit jobs).

    With the unsurmountable realization crisis thus disguised, new speculative capital no longer need even be real — it can be entirely fictional. Fictional capital that no longer represents future potential real capital. Fictional capital that perpetually expands “on paper” only such as US national debt. Socially, this appears as an inflation of non-labor assets relative to labor, indefinitely. (Jehu)

    This does not imply that the material footprint of commodities has stopped growing, however. Even though surplus value is no longer *really* growing, output continues to grow, perpetually accelerating labor time (through still-rising organic composition) and expanding material consumption and output (Postone and, though more crudely, many environmental scientists.)

    Lastly, the next limit is not on the horizon but is the very bright light coming right at as rapidly in this dark tunnel: environmental exhaustion. We seem unable to break from increasing emissions and increasing consumption generally even though, within a very few years at best, we will have locked in a “hot earth” future that has a very good chance of destroying civilization within the lifetimes of some people who are alive today. (IPCC and many others.)

    The overthrow of capital is now not only possible and imminent if “we” want it — it is necessary immediately for society to survive at all.

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    1. Nice summary.

      Here’s the problem I’m having with this. If money (gold) has no value under the this anachronistic regime, then central banks hoard gold only because it has speculative value in the luxury market, which means prices are determined according to marginalism. If that’s true, then after a century of “permanent crisis” of valorization I’m not sure if there can be a “reinterpretation” of Marx, only a debunking of Marx along with the LTV.

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      1. The way I see it:

        Empirically, central banks currently hoard gold in fear of or in hopes of using or even creating a crisis that *somehow* causes “real money” to return to circulation. By “empirically”, I am thinking of recent years deals from China to buy oil for gold, and deals from Russia to trade with direct commodity swaps with, e.g., Iraq. The gold is in anticipation of or with the hope of triggering the breakdown of the U.S. global currency sovereignty.

        Just because they happen to try to hedge that way, though, doesn’t mean they are correct that it will work.

        They hoard it because they their mentality is caught up in the fetish, in other words. The fiat phase is just a temporary glitch, in that view, perhaps.

        p.s. When you say “Marx along with the LTV” I think you mean that Marx adopted the Ricardian LTV or that Capital is basically a development of an LTV, even if it is not quite Ricardian. I don’t think either of those is a defensible reading. The concept that marxian Value operates socially as a measure of abstract labor time is nothing at all like what people often mean by “LTV”.

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      2. “When you say “Marx along with the LTV” I think you mean that Marx adopted the Ricardian LTV or that Capital is basically a development of an LTV…”

        I’m referring to the objective nature of LTV and Marx’s work which builds off of it in contrast to a subjective theory of value that claims atomic individual preferences determine the sole value of a commodity. I don’t mean to reduce Capital to merely an extension of LTV. My position is Marx’s theory of society stands as the reigning theory as long as it explains our observations better than any other theory. It explains central bank behavior today just as it did in the 19th century. To claim a change in policy suddenly rendered the universal equivalent valueless, yet observe behavior by the central banks that suggest it is not valueless, requires a better explanation than “stupid people do stupid things”. They were doing stupid things prior to the 1930’s as well.

        But, Jehu already mentioned he’ll elaborate on this topic. There also may be previous posts on this that I haven’t read yet.

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      3. Rory,

        > ” To claim a change in policy suddenly rendered the universal equivalent valueless,”

        Neither Jehu or I have argued that a “change in policy suddenly rendered [all commodities] valueless”.

        The opposite. All commodities became valueless, and so policy around currency changed.

        Commodities in general became valueless through development of the general knowledge of society, and through the development of production. That process arrived at a point where additions to the supply of labor power are generally superfluous.

        That is to say that value is no longer self-expanding. Without the possibility of self-expansion, the social logic of value no longer results in the reliable reproduction of labor power. The spastic corpse of capital may nevertheless continue to expand material consumption and so continue to expand the supply of labor power – but there is no virtuous cycle any longer that will sustain that labor power. No profit it in, don’t ya see.

        Jehu’s hypothesis of a labor supply shock — drastic shortening of labor hours — makes perfect sense in that frame. From the perspective of the present it would appear as an overwhelming large contraction in existing value. Yet, so contracted, it might once again expand — hence “the system” might return to reproducing labor power, initially at this much lower rate of productivity. Lather-rinse-repeat and we are again back at the value-free society but that’s ok, we have plenty of output with almost no wage slavery input — and from there we can control production instead of being controlled by it.

        > a better explanation than “stupid people do stupid things”.

        You yourself exhibit confusion about the state of things Jehu (and I guess now I) are pointing at. You are not stupid. Neither are the bankers. One can be not stupid yet incorrect.

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      4. “Commodities in general became valueless through development of the general knowledge of society, and through the development of production. That process arrived at a point where additions to the supply of labor power are generally superfluous.”

        This sounds like a testable claim. We should be able to point to the technologies, level of production, and knowledge that lead to a state where value could not expand and remember that capital is global. I’d say capital expanded into third-world countries during the entire 20th and still exploits most of the world’s population, based on an expanding money supply.

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      5. > This sounds like a testable claim.

        Yes.

        > I’d say capital expanded into third-world countries during the entire 20th

        You are speaking of an expansion of the geographic sphere of influence of capitalist society. The self-expansion of value can manifest that way but the two are not the same and geographic expansion does not imply expansion of value.

        Alternatively, perhaps you are speaking of the temporal expansion of concrete labor time – e.g. twice as many workers with each still doing 8 hours per day, say. Again, value expansion can manifest that way but the two are not the same, and expansion of hours does not imply expansion of value.

        The phrase “absolute expansion of the total Value present in society” is meaningless. (“Money has no price.”) The concept of self-expanding value does not refer to any societal aggregate – the total value of society.

        Rather, value is always relative. As a standard of measurement, (commodity) money merely tells one the value of other commodities relative to an ounce of gold. There is no absolute scale.

        One might try to say that in year 1 the economy contained the value of X tons gold, and in year 10 it contained the value of 2X tons gold – but that does not indicate any absolute expansion of value has occurred. After all, the value of a commodity money is by definition immeasurable (again “Money has no price”).

        On the surface, that would seem problematic to the concept of self-expanding value — without a definition for the total Value present in society, what could it possibly mean to say that Value is “self-expanding”? But there is no contradiction here. Just a non-intuitive topology.

        Imagine the earth as a perfect sphere, for a moment. Given the way that gravity works, everywhere you stand on this sphere is, literally, “the top of the world”. Step in any direction and you have stepped down relative to where you were, only to again wind up at the top of the world. In a sense this is an illusion – you’ve merely followed a geodesic – no point on the earth is literally “the top of the world”. In another sense it is perfectly real – measured relative to the path that light travels, every part of spherical earth is always below the point where you are standing. The falling off of the earth from wherever you stand is always locally true – not absolutely true.

        How, then, is this topological analogy applicable to the self-expansion of value in a capitalist society?

        Just as Einstein stands at some point on the spherical earth and makes his measurements *from that standpoint*, every member of capitalist society stands in some definite position relative to the then existing market. They are, socially speaking, “near” various price observations, specific production cycles, etc.. They can objectively discern, at least in a commodity-money version of capitalism, whether on average surplus is accumulating or not (or if it is too close to call).

        Those objective observations of the circulation of capital, made from a personified position, determine whether our scientist in a capitalist society can continue to act as a capitalist subject. If our observer is a worker, whether she continues to try to sell labor to buy subsistence. If a capitalist, whether to invest or hoard.

        A collapse of value would appear as a halt in the circulation of commodities – as we saw in the early 1930s! And, as we would predict, a specter of a permanent rupture from capital haunted society. [enter Keynes, stage reich]

        Subsequent to that breakdown of production on the basis of exchange, the state’s currency regime has been destabilized – money printing during the war, Bretton Woods and its end, the present mess. Our stylized capitalist subject who makes observations of (socially) “near” prices, production cycles etc. is in the dark — but may not know it. The literal Valuelessness of the currency is not immediately obvious just as Value itself is not intuitive or obvious normally. Empirically, for sure, continuing to act *as if* Value were still self-expanding does result in the material expansion of capitalist expansion and thus, close at hand, is an ecological extinction — the ultimate refutation of the hypothesis that Value continues to expand.

        Therein lies some hope? I don’t mean that the death of civilization is good and hope it is avoided. The hope is that if we look, we *can* observe that that is coming and there we *can* know that Value-expansion is long gone and therefore we *can*, seeing we are no longer capitalist subjects, begin to act that way.

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      6. “One might try to say that in year 1 the economy contained the value of X tons gold, and in year 10 it contained the value of 2X tons gold – but that does not indicate any absolute expansion of value has occurred. After all, the value of a commodity money is by definition immeasurable (again “Money has no price”)”

        It’s measured by abstract labor time.

        If in year ten there remained the same amount of gold as year one, then the value of the economy would have depreciated proportionally against gold. So what happened after the post-WWI recession and recovery that caused a collapse of value by 1933?

        Your earth analogy only demonstrates why we need to base our theories on objective measurements. The subject on earth always exists in relationships to other subjects that share the same sphere of existence. The subject may chose to navigate purely in reference to itself, but it does not do so in reality. It moves in relation to the magnetic pole, the pole defined by the axis of spin, the spacial relationships to other bodies, its movement through spacetime governed by the laws of relativity and the laws of the universe that have existed before humans. Axioms of our reality are what we measure our ideas against to determine the truthfulness of them. A scientific analysis of the economy is what separates Marxists from the theologians of capital who elevate the mind of man above the natural laws of physics. Therefore, Value is not purely imaginary, but a way of describing the political-economic mind of man and its relationship to universal constraints.

        If the value of labor power collapsed in the 1930’s, and it was not the result of policy, then what happened in the economy that drove it to zero?

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  16. > A scientific analysis of the economy is what separates [Marx]…

    I would agree with that.

    > If the value of labor power collapsed in the 1930’s, and it was not the result of policy, then what happened in the economy that drove it to zero?

    The ratio of commodity prices to the cost of constant and variable capital needed to produce them fell close to 1. Additional investment in new real capital tended not to fair better or even to subtract from surplus.

    Manifestations through the lenses of bourgeois economists likely include things like the very high value to earnings ratio in stocks prior to the 1929 crash, the hoarding of capital in spite of mass unemployment, and the discovery that injection of massive, non-productive demand could reverse some symptoms.

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      1. This is an excellent question. I hope to write a post on it this week. In it I will show at least one reason why prices of commodities can (and must) go to zero well before complete automation.

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      2. > “But, assuming society was not fully automated, how did v go to zero?”

        In a way, you already know the answer I’ll give — it just doesn’t satisfy you. If the collapse of s were to permanently halt the circulation of capital, v would not 0 it would simply not exist. In fact, though, circulation has continued on the basis of fiat in a system in which all wage goods and labor power are exchanged for valueless paper. By measurement, then, v is 0. Marx’s theory could be wrong or inapplicable, but if it is not wrong and is applicable, then v is 0.

        It’s interesting to me to try to figure out what v = 0 means more concretely – what social facts are there associated with it? For example, the quantity of labor hours continues to expand but, by hypothesis, no surplus is realized. The expanded labor and the unrealized surplus use values seem superfluous – as in “Hence [capital] diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition – question of life or death – for the necessary.”

        That observation, in turn, opens the “v = 0” hypothesis up to a broad social and historical analysis. After all, the superfluous use values don’t simply sit idle in warehouses. They are used and largely they are used by the state for its general purpose of imposing and maintaining a social order in which superfluous production continues to grow and appears to be a question of life or death for production to happen at all. We are increasingly in the business of forging our own chains and I would argue that this is a very different condition than was found in even the harshest parts of 19th century industrial capital. Up until the collapse in value and adoption of fiat one could argue that our labors brought the possibility of liberation from capital nearer. Beyond that collapse, as labor is directed more and more to its own confinement and forced self-reproduction, it is not so clear.

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      3. Yes. This is basically my conclusion as well. Exchange value disappears when the profit rate falls to zero and well before socially necessary labor time goes to zero.

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      4. I don’t have a huge problem with defining v as “undefined” during periods of crisis. It’s another thing, however, to ignore causation only for the sake of the argument when it doesn’t add any clarity to the subject. Go back in time as far as you want, you’ll find that human labor had to be expended prior to the manifestation of surplus.

        If s collapsed because there was a permanent collapse in v, then I could see how a permanent breakdown argument could be made. On the other hand, if s collapsed due to the inherent instability of capitalism, resulting in a collapse of v during the subsequent circuits, then all we have is a crisis that can be overcome when the particular bottleneck(s) are resolved.

        The chains that we’ve forged are to be found in the multiple global warming feedback loops we’ve triggered and the destruction of our biosphere. Ecological economies were laughed at and still pretty much are today.

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      5. You have the historical process backward: “v” collapsed because there was a permanent collapse of “s”, not the reverse. There is no Tugan-Baranovsky-style bottleneck that could be resolved to restore equilibrium. Seriously, you have to be aware that Marx addressed the objection that this is a problem of imbalance in the economy in detail in chapter 15 of volume 3.

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      6. I agree with you, Rory, insofar as you are observing that the destruction of capital by unmitigated global warming may well raise the value of commodities and labor above 0. That is what I think I see among some of the representatives of capital – an assumption that the crisis is not an existential threat to society / civilization itself and then an ethos that the capital destruction it entails will mean a big payday for the well placed investor.

        > “Ecological economies were laughed at and still pretty much are today.”

        My imaginary of post capitalism is very unconvincing precisely because it emphasizes the complete lack — even hostility to — any kind of “economic system”. My position is that I believe very much in the importance of collective planning and that I reject entirely any idea of a collective plan. Collective planning merely sharpens the general knowledge and, that accomplished, we each do what we choose with our time.

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