To summarize my argument in part one:
The present crisis arises from the fact that there is a mass of superfluous capital that cannot, under any circumstances, become real capital — that is, cannot produce surplus value and, therefore, profit. This mass of superfluous capital poses the constant threat to the mode of production of a general devaluation of the existing capital as a whole. If a general crisis of devaluation is to be avoided, the state must run deficits, i.e., it must spend more than it takes in in tax revenue. State deficit spending is, therefore, not determined by the needs of society (and, in particular, by the needs of the social producers), but by the needs of the owners of capital, who, if they are to avoid a nominal devaluation of this superfluous capital, must hand it over to the state to be consumed unproductively in return for interest payments.
The purpose then for the fascist state to borrow the excess capital is to avoid a nominal devaluation of capital. Avoiding this nominal devaluation of capital does not mean the capitalists avoid a real devaluation of their capital. Which is to say, the real means of production and labor power of society is really consumed by the fascist state in the form of unproductive expenditures. But, in this real devaluation of capital, the nominal value of the capital, expressed in some currency, is replaced by the fascist state in circulation by valueless tokens, by treasuries, which represent it only symbolically and which take effect as such. The real capital consumed is, therefore, replaced by fictions of capital in the form of promissory notes issued by the state and on which it pays interest.
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