Capital, commodity production and collapse (IV): Collapse or Collapsed?

Part 4: Back to the future?

If you ask the typical Marxist to name the most important prediction made by Marx’s labor theory of value, they will likely point to his prediction of a proletarian social revolution. Few, if any, Marxists will argue Marx’s most important prediction was that commodity production would break down, capitalist private property would be expropriated and the bourgeois state would be forced to undertake management of production.

Which is odd, since, in the intervening 160 years, no successful proletarian revolution has occurred, yet we have witnessed the collapse of production based on exchange value, the expropriation of capitalist private property and we have seen the state undertake management of production — a ubiquitous and routine function in all countries today. By the measure of an alleged prediction of a proletarian social revolution, it can be said Marx’s theory, at best, remains unproven. Yet, by the measure of a break down of production based on exchange value, Marx’s theory has been remarkably accurate.

It’s almost as if Marx knew what he was talking about. “Almost”, reply many of our most influential Marxist theorists.

In my last post I suggested a proletarian social revolution was only a contingent possibility, while the breakdown of production based on exchange value was the necessary immediate historical result of capitalist production. In plain English, Marx predicted commodity production would break down and the management of production would have to be socialized. IF the working class was sufficiently organized, it could take advantage of this event to assert its own control over the production process. According to Marx’s labor theory of value, the break down of production based on exchange value had to take place, while proletarian socialist revolution was contingent on the state of the working class itself — it’s organization and consciousness.

Did commodity production break down as Marx predicted?

Here, almost all Marxist theorists seem to agree no such break down occurred. Michael Heinrich, for instance, in his “An Introduction to all Three Volumes of Capital” asserts Marx’s original prediction of breakdown of commodity production was mistaken and ultimately withdrawn by Marx himself — an argument he reiterates in a 2013 essay for Monthly Review. Among an influential section of Marxists theorists this assertion is the standard boilerplate.

Two things are problematic with this assertion: First, a close reading of the literature will show most Marxist theorists conflate the breakdown of commodity production with the breakdown of production for profit itself — a conflation with no support in Marx’s own writings. Second, to support the mainstream view among Marxists that the two mode of production are the same, Marxist theorists have been forced to substantially revise or “correct” what they see as ambiguities or incorrect formulations in Marx’s labor theory of value.

It is no surprise to me that the effort by some Marxist theorists to substantially revise or correct Marx’s labor theory of value begins with his definition of money. We are, after all, talking about the breakdown of production based on exchange value. In Marx’s labor theory of value, exchange value, the phenomenal expression of the value of commodities, takes the material form of a money commodity. Logically, therefore, a breakdown of production based on exchange value must the form of a breakdown of production based on money itself.

Breakdown of money in Marx’s theory

In his labor theory, Marx assigns two chief functions for money: First, money supplies a concrete material for the expression of the value of commodities. Second, money serves as a medium for the circulation of the commodities. The breakdown of production based on exchange value (money) must, therefore, imply the breakdown of the relation between these two chief functions of money in Marx’s theory.

How might the function of money as the material to express the value of commodities become detached from the function of money as medium for circulation of commodities? What we call money actually consists of a number of materials that together carry out the two chief functions of money. There is the commodity itself, which supplies the concrete material for the expression of the values of commodities. There is a (typically) national currency that serves as symbolic representative of money and medium for circulation of commodities. Finally, there is credit money, which represents money that does not as yet exist.

Since each of the functions of money are represented in the specific material body of a specific money instrument, the possibility exists they might become increasingly divorced from one another over time. More or less gold may be present than is required to express that values of commodities. More or less currency may be in circulation than is required to serve as a medium for the circulation of commodities. More or less credit might be available than can be satisfied by actual production of commodities. Since money implies production itself is unplanned and anarchic, the relations between each of the money forms and the relation between these money forms and the requirements of production are bound to constantly fluctuate.

Moreover, since production and exchange are subject to innumerable fluctuation arising from the anarchy of production, the relations between the money forms must be allowed to shift as the material requirements of production shift. Thus commodity production not only implies imbalances between the various money forms and the needs of production, it necessarily requires this flexibility.  Marx’s prediction of a breakdown of production based on exchange value, i.e., based on money, therefore, results from the impact production for profit has on this flexible monetary (commodity production) system.

The key money form to understand in this relationship is not gold (commodity money) or currency (paper money), but credit money; i.e., money that does not yet actually exist, an IOU, a promise to pay actual exchange value in the future.

While gold is the money in a system of production based on exchange value, credit is the money in a system of capitalist production for profit. Gold is money in its palpable material form, but credit is imaginary money, or future money — money that does not yet exist. The antagonism between the two modes of production must, of necessity, take the form of a contradiction between gold and credit money, between actual exchange value and the promise to pay exchange value in the future. According to Suzanne de Brunhoff, “Credit money issued by banking systems is the form of money in modern capitalism.” Indeed, it is significant, in this regard, that Marx argued, “The uprising of the proletariat is the abolition of bourgeois credit, for it is the abolition of bourgeois production and its order.” (Class Struggles in France)

Credit, currency and gold

The objection to my argument, however, is that, as  George Caffentzis explains, Marx held the credit system ultimately could never be detached from gold. And, indeed, Caffentzis’ argument is actually supported by Marx in Capital, when Marx writes:

“But it should always be borne in mind that, in the first place, money — in the form of precious metal — remains the foundation from which the credit system, by its very nature, can never detach itself.” —Marx, Capital, Volume 3

Anitra Nelson, who has made an exhaustive survey of Marx’s writings on the subject, concurs with Caffentzis in a book edited by Fred Moseley, “Marx’s Theory of Money: Modern Appraisals”, and in a separate book, “Marx’s Concept of Money: the God of Commodities” that she published in 1999. However, these two Marxist theorists overlook a essential caveat: Marx argues that the credit system can never be detached from gold, but he never suggested the credit system founded on gold was itself immune to catastrophic collapse itself.

And this is exactly what happened with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, an event I have argue elsewhere that fully meets Marx’s definition of a breakdown of production based on exchange value.

Marxists theorists like Heinrich, de Brunhoff, Nelson and Caffentzis never asked the question they should have asked: Is a credit system founded on state issued valueless inconvertible fiat currency the same as one founded on commodity money? The answer to this question can only be affirmative if commodity money is the same as state issued valueless inconvertible fiat currency. No one, including the Marxist theorists I have referenced in this post makes the argument Marx considered commodity money and fiat currency as more or less the same thing. Yet, we are supposed to accept the idea that, in Marx’s theory, a credit system based on the former is the same as a credit system based on the latter.

On what basis is this assertion founded? What reason do we have to treat two different credit systems as the same when the monies on which they are founded are not?  If we strictly hold to Marx’s labor theory of value, it is obvious a credit system based on commodity money is one founded on exchange value; and, if we strictly hold to Marx’s labor theory of value, it is obvious a credit system based on fiat money is not founded on exchange value unless this paper currency is fixed to a definite quantity of gold.

This raises the implication that the collapse of the gold standard during the Great Depression and especially after 1971 is telling Marxists a story they have not yet absorbed into their analyses. If Marx’s breakdown already happened as I argue, Marxists may be looking for something to occur in the future that has actually already happened in the past.

Concretely, this would mean Luxemburg’s argument mankind faces a choice between “socialism or barbarism” is not in our future, as many Marxists assume, but in our past. We made that choice already and we chose barbarism.

26 thoughts on “Capital, commodity production and collapse (IV): Collapse or Collapsed?”

  1. You write that today state paper money is the basis for credit, but one of the key things I learned that is very important (though it’s not even a particular Marxist point, it was know eg to the Banking school) from presently co-editing a book of classical Marxist essays on money, is that there is no clear stance on whether declaration of incontrovertibly of notes means that they turn into state paper money.

    Classical Marxists like Engels Kautsky and Hilferding thought so, but they have been criticized for this position, see eg recently Vytautas Liutkus: http://www.academia.edu/9402897/The_Law_of_Value_Marxist_political_economy_in_the_Age_of_Inflation

    And vice versa, there is no agreement that state paper money always imply inconvertibility. I found that English translators of the term Marx uses for state paper money (Zwangskurs), does not mean ‘inconvertibility’ in German (at least not the only meaning). I think you can read Marx in the section on state paper money as including convertible tokens (I personally think it would make more sense):
    https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm#S2c

    On theory of collapse, again I advise you to check out Herman Cahn, a forgotten American Marxist who proposed a theory of collapse based on his analysis of money. https://archive.org/search.php?query=herman%20cahn

    – Noa

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    1. Thanks for these suggestions. I will follow up on all of them. I am not the expert here, of course. But only someone trying to grope my way through Marx’s labor theory of value and avoid the pitfalls so many others seem to have encountered.

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  2. The basic pitfall to be avoided lies in simply classifying today’s currency as state paper money with forced currency (‘Zwangskurs’), or ‘fiat’ as you like to call it (though this phrase is not found in Marx). State paper money follows laws entirely different from credit/banknotes. To put it simply: credit is voluntarily taken up and has to be returned by the borrower, whereas state paper money is forcefully expended by the state as payment and doesn’t have to return/leave circulation (this would require taxes), so unlike credit, there is no automatic reflux.

    This is a basic point, and if one initially has been overlooking this, I think part of it has to do with faulty translation from German, and part due to the Marx’s assumption of some familiarity on the part of the reader with the Banking school (Tooke, Fullarton).

    Liutkus had a blog with the same essay, but it looks like he took it down. It had more footnotes. He references Claus Germer (and another Brazilian writer).

    In the course of co-editing the money volume we gathered tons of info, but a lot will be left out. I’d to hear your thoughts/suggestions for it, if this were somehow possible, and I always am interested in discussing more on this topic.

    – Noa

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    1. Germer is good. I have read his stuff. There is an automatic reflux that is being missed by Marxist theorists: the accumulation of fascist state debt. The credit extended to the state has nowhere else to go; it has reached the end of the line. The rate of accumulation may periodically rise or fall, but it never reverses. If a mass of capital lent to the state is paid off, it is immediately replaced by a new, larger, mass of capital that can find no place in productive employment. This very much resembles the excess capital that Marx in c15,v3 argues can only find a place in productive employment if other capital of equal size falls out.

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      1. The law of reflux refers to banknotes being returned to the issuer/ bank (who then destroys it), so it is withdrawn from circulation. When the state issues debt, i.e. voluntarily receives currency from its creditors, it also has to be repaid by the state, so there is a reflux. State debt is not the same thing as state paper money, which again, unlike credit/banknotes, doesn’t have to repaid/withdrawn from circulation; it is printed directly by government order to pay for its state expenses, in history usually of a military/revolutionary type, i.e. it forcefully enters into circulation.

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      2. I cannot fully respond to this in the context of a comment reply, but it seems to me state debt does not operate the way people think it does. Let me propose an alternative that might, at first, seem illogical: In the case of today’s state debt, capital is permanently withdrawn from circulation, lent to the state and immediately destroyed. The state does not need to borrow, capital needs to lend. The issuance of state paper to pay for expenses is the first phase of this process, while the credit lent to the state is the return of this paper to the state in the form of debt. This credit money (capital) is destroyed by the state and does not return to circulation.

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  3. “Is a credit system founded on state issued valueless inconvertible fiat currency the same as one founded on commodity money?”

    The answer is no, but this is the wrong question to ask because our current credit system is not founded on inconvertible fiat currency. It is still very much founded on commodity money indirectly through the inconvertible fiat currency, because that fiat currency is itself still founded on commodity money.

    The peg between dollars and gold is now floating, not fixed. But the peg is still there. It continues to discipline the dollar-token creation of the U.S. treasury and the dollar-credit creation of the Federal Reserve.

    The capitalist state still must reckon with the possibility of a “strike of the bondholders” and a flight to gold whenever the token-dollar and/or credit-dollar money supply is increased too quickly with respect to world gold production. If hoarding gold ever becomes more attractive than extending dollar-denominated loans at a certain fixed percentage, then dollar-holders will rush to buy gold with those dollars and refuse to loan out those dollars for that certain fixed return denominated in dollars. Interest rates will rise to eat up the profit of enterprise. Credit will become scarce. There will be a credit crisis.

    In this situation, unless the capitalist state steps in more aggressively, the credit crisis will seize up capitalist production. Yet, the more the capitalist state steps in to offer its own cheap credit in dollars, the more unattractive holding dollars and dollar-denominated assets will become, the more the bondholders will go on strike, and so the capitalist state will have to step in as credit provider even more, only to depreciate its own currency, ad infinitum. See the 1970s stagflation crisis.

    If the capitalist state were willing to completely ignore and expropriate these bondholders, through the reckless expansion of its own currency and credit thus causing the depreciation of bondholder’s dollar-denominated assets, then we might be talking about a different universe. Then the state, and private business, would not have to rely on bondholders for financing. The state could just directly print token money any time it ran a budget deficit, in effect deciding unilaterally what percentage of dollars in circulation, and thus what percentage of social labor, the state should be able to command.

    If private businesses needed money capital in this situation, and bondholders were not willing to loan money except at a million percent interest (or except if denominated in gold rather than dollars), then the capitalist state (through the Federal Reserve) could just extend endless zero-interest dollar loans to private business to bridge the gap. This would basically be like the capitalist state assuming all responsibility for planning production, by deciding who gets loans.

    I believe this is the universe that you are anticipating when you talk about the “collapse of production on the basis of exchange value.” But this has happened yet. Nor do I see it, once initiated, as being a long, stable epoch.

    Hyperinflation would pretty quickly make the state currency useless as a stable unit of account, and everyone would switch over to gold or, if gold possession were outlawed, the next best money commodity as a unit of account (and so on if the state tried to outlaw this other money commodity…assuming that the state could enforce all of these bans).

    This would be the return to barbarism—an *explicit* return to the “barbarous relic” of gold or some other commodity money to make up for the severing of the very real *implicit* link that STILL exists between dollars and gold.

    Of course, hyperinflation could also provide society as good an opportunity as any to get rid of units of account of value altogether and initiate socialism—production for regulated social use rather than private exchange. Then, if we could truly overcome scarcity, we could initiate communism—production for free social use.

    Anyways, my point is that you are misreading the real trajectory of capitalism by saying that the “collapse of production on the basis of exchange value” has already occurred just because the capitalist state has severed its fixed convertibility between its currency and gold. What you miss is that the capitalist state still relies on, and is disciplined by, a floating convertibility between its currency and gold. We are still on a “floating gold standard,” if you will. Production on the basis of exchange value remains very much alive.

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  4. I understand that ‘real’ capitalism broke down in the 30s and Keynes provided a step by step for how the state could manage capitalist production to keep the show on the road, and how the Nixon gold shock gave the scheme another innings.

    That is to say, ‘commodity production would break down,’ strike one, and ‘the bourgeois state would be forced to undertake management of production,’ strike two.

    As I understand it, you also assert that due to these, at any moment since the 30s we proles could raise our consciousness and organize to end jobs, money, property, and the state. And I can see this didn’t happen because, now as then when he was writing, we are rather bovine and don’t get it; and, unlike when ol’ Karl was writing, we are as a class tightly coupled with the fasc-cap-state system, with our stock portfolios, bonuses, and pension schemes.

    Fine.

    But what of ol’ Karl’s prediction that ‘capitalist private property would be expropriated’? I don’t see that happening anywhere except where national capitals try it on and end up failing badly. Is that moment of appropriation to be total, glbal, everywhere all at once?

    And what I am still not clear on, what the post fails to address for me, is that, yes, clap clap, he was a clever fellow, good predictions, but nowhere in all this is there anything actually useful for you or I, other than to be smug about how savvy we are.

    What am I missing here?

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    1. I made a point in that post that capitalist money is credit money. A credit system founded on the state’s effective monopoly over money is a credit system that has been effectively monopolized by the state — a demand that appears in, of all places, the Communist Manifesto.

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      1. Nothing. But the question to be answered is this: “What can the state do now that it controls the means of exchange?” The answer, as i hope to show, is that the state can paralyze the falling rate of profit, at least for a period of time (80 years, so far).

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      2. I don’t mean to be unduly alarmist but it seems to me that:

        As you argue, the state is obligated to consume value, including the labor commodity, non-productively. This is a paradox, at first glance, since in the individual wage transaction, labor power is *always* directed to a productive activity.

        How can an aggregate of wage transactions, each engaged in a productive activity, add up to 0 net production, or even a negative net production?

        What must be produced, in some sense, must be use values that destroy values.

        No sector can be spared from the imperative to destroy values.

        Consequently, the imperative includes production that destroys labor power.

        The carceral state or really any other form of perpetual genocide appears as a fascist necessity — not some kind of extrinsically supplied perversion.

        If the state does not actively destroy labor power — which is to say people’s lives — capital will be overwhelmed by its supply.

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      3. A hint can be found in this passage from David Leonhardt:

        More than any other country, Germany — Nazi Germany — then set out on a serious stimulus program. The government built up the military, expanded the autobahn, put up stadiums for the 1936 Berlin Olympics and built monuments to the Nazi Party across Munich and Berlin.

        In other words, the state can unproductively consume surplus value by redirecting investment into sectors that produce no value and add no new productive capacity to the national capital.

        Here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/business/economy/01leonhardt.html?_r=0

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      4. Sure, the state can pay people to do superfluous labour; build ‘bridges to nowhere’, the Chinese “communist” party has paid its people to build huge ghost towns full of tower blocks, building building building but with no one moving in; and today the corporations do give people pointless jobs, like the USSR did ignoring the invention of calculating cash registers and having several cashiers for each category of good at the supermarket, eg where many of their shops shops are not yet using the self-service cashier robots and employing people instead; Graeber has a famous essay about how many jobs not facing obvious technologies obsolescence are also ‘bullshit jobs.’ In a racist society that’s the white side of superfluous labor, and the ‘other’ side is as Thomas says, the fascist corporate-state’s active destruction of people’s labor power, with for-profit prisons incarcerating more and more people, or shooting them because “I don’t know why.”

        By giving people pointless work and paying them in non-money greenbacks, capitalists are able to extract surplus non-money greenbacks. But while we all depend on them greens for food etc, we are trapped.

        I see no indication that if this worked for 80 years, it will ever stop working. Do you?

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  5. Jehu wrote: “I cannot fully respond to this in the context of a comment reply, but it seems to me state debt does not operate the way people think it does. Let me propose an alternative that might, at first, seem illogical: In the case of today’s state debt, capital is permanently withdrawn from circulation, lent to the state and immediately destroyed. The state does not need to borrow, capital needs to lend. The issuance of state paper to pay for expenses is the first phase of this process, while the credit lent to the state is the return of this paper to the state in the form of debt. This credit money (capital) is destroyed by the state and does not return to circulation.”

    State paper money (‘Staatspapiergeld’) is not a government bond/state credit. The state needs to borrow currency, to pay for its expenses, so it is immediately put in circulation again (even if on unproductive things). When the state repays the debt to the creditor, assume for sake simplicity directly to the central bank, then the currency is withdrawn/destroyed. The central bank does not need to buy Treasuries, but recently it did so to try to put currency in circulation. However, since it is not state paper money, it doesn’t forcefully enter circulation as payment for commodities, but sits idly in the commercial banks deposits, so that these banks again deposit it at the Fed. Basically why QE does not produce the desired rise of prices, can be explained because the currency is precisely not following the laws of state paper money.

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    1. I would say four things:
      1. I agree state currency must be forced into circulation and that debt isn’t state issued paper money.
      2. I would disagree the state must borrow; rather, I think capital must lend.
      3. The state does not repay the capital it borrows, although it does service its debt.
      4. The capital is unproductively consumed (destroyed) by the state, not repaid.

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  6. The state must not really borrow, it could also raise taxes or start printing state paper money to cover its expenses. The state cannot really be forced by private lenders to take on debt by accepting currency from these private lenders against its own will. Banks may very well have to lend in order for their business to survive, but they cannot literally force someone to take up a loan. The state servicing its debt means that it repays currency to its creditors, by being able to borrow another batch of currency from creditors. If you refer to this repaying of loans as “unproductive”, that might be true, like any manufacturer that has to pay his creditors also might be called as unproductively wasting money that he could have been investing in machines and labour power. For my point here though, it does not matter on what the state spends its borrowed currency. Currency must again be repaid, ie withdrawn from circulation. That the banks then grant again a new loan, does not alter that, rather presupposes it.

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  7. To be clear, there is no state paper money today. While the state does technically print money at the bureau of engraving and printing, this practical job could just as well be done by a private company. The bureau of engraving and printing prints Fed notes only on order from the Fed, not the state. The Fed comes to these printing orders based on estimations of the requirements of circulation.

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    1. This is very interesting material, Noa. Thanks for sharing it. Hilferding’s concept of “socially necessary circulation value” is something that should be investigated. I think Kautsky was too quick to dismiss it. It definitely can add to a discussion of inflation and the falling rate of profit.

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